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1Section 1 
Introduction
In light o f the increasing flow of millions of dollars into the sports industry during the last 
two decades, notably the international soccer market, the repercussions from the wave of 
economic activity have come under scrutiny by economists. In France alone, while the real Gross 
Domestic Product for the country has grown at an annualized rate o f 2.75%, the soccer industry 
in France has experienced a 500% growth in ticket sales, 3,300% growth in sponsorship income, 
122,000% increase in income from television contracts overall during the same time period 
(Bourg and Gouget, 2005). Sports have become such a pivotal facet o f the economic structure 
due to their status as an integral part o f today’s society with upwards of 20% of French citizens 
partaking in licensed athletic events and 75% claiming to be participants in sporting activities, 
both professional and recreational. It has been increasingly evident that the actions taken by 
professional sports teams have a far reaching impact on the global market. For the 2008-2009 
season the combined budget o f the teams in Europe’s top five leagues (England, France, Italy, 
Germany and Spain) reached a level o f $7.9 billion, a figure that continues to grow from year to 
year (Deloitte, 2010). Evidence o f this drastic increase in economic activity can be seen by the 
recent introductions of more than 40 professional soccer teams into various capital markets. The 
vast majority of the teams who have introduced capital stock into trading markets are British 
teams, since the practice was just recently put in place in France. Only two French teams have 
tested the market thus far, with Olympique Lyon and FC Istres being the first. Another trend in 
the funding of professional soccer teams is privatization with the purchasing o f clubs by 
enterprises and billionaire investors for record setting amounts. Examples include the recent
2acquisition o f French team Paris Saint-Germain in 2011 by the billionaire investment group QIA 
and the purchase o f English side Manchester City by Abu Dhabi United Group in 2008. Lastly, 
the drastic growth in the soccer market can be attributed to the globalization o f the sport and 
increased revenues through national and international television and sponsorship contracts. All of 
these actions have had a hand in not only improving revenues for the teams involved, but in 
increasing the fees paid for the transferring o f players and the wages that professional soccer 
players receive annually. This research seeks to quantify the determinants o f a modern soccer 
player’s market value when being transferred within the country o f France while taking into 
consideration the ramifications at a macro level o f an ever increasing and globalized sports 
economy.
The purpose o f this research is to analyze the changes that have transpired in the French 
Ligue 1 transfer market in the post-Bosman ruling era and to estimate a statistical model using 
the ordinary least squares regression method that estimates the market value of a player in the 
French sector of the international player transfer market. The independent variables will be a 
combination o f statistics from the player’s in game performance and personal data, the 
characteristics of the purchasing clubs, and the characteristics o f the selling clubs. The transfer 
market of soccer players is an international market established by the governing body, FIFA 
(Federation Internationale de Football Association), which allows the member clubs to 
participate in an active market for the buying and selling of their players twice a year in July- 
August and again in January. In the last twenty years numerous academic studies have been 
published focusing on the viability of the soccer transfer market as an economic market similar 
to other traditional trading markets, with much research devoted to the determination o f players’ 
market values. However, little research has been done on the French sector of the transfer
3market, with studies traditionally focusing on the English and German sectors of the market. This 
study will be based on the modern theory on the transfer market and take into account recent 
developments such as the existence o f monopoly rents (Dobson et al., 1999), the superstar effect 
(Franck et al., 2008) and the ramifications of the Bosnian ruling. These subjects will be further 
discussed later in Section II o f this paper. The international transfer market and soccer economy 
have both undergone numerous changes during the last twenty-five years, which have led to an 
increasing amount o f leniency on the part o f the governing bodies and have liberalized the 
business. This, in turn, has created a lucrative and attractive industry conducive to growing 
revenues that has enticed the placement o f new capital into soccer teams and players. This wave 
o f liberalization and influx o f large amounts of capital into the soccer market, both in France and 
abroad, has allowed the transfer market to grow to the size that it is today, with £190 million 
being spent in 2011 alone by French teams on the transferring of players to teams in the Ligue 1.
The paper will be structured in the following manner. Relevant existing literature on the 
topics of the foundation of French professional soccer and recent developments in the transfer 
market is presented in Section II. Special attention will be given in this section to the expansion 
o f the French soccer transfer market on the macro level, and the changes in the business of 
soccer in France, including the Bosnian ruling, that have allowed for the increase in transfer 
prices. Section III will present the data to be used, discuss the hypothesized results, and present 
the regression model for the empirical study. The results from the empirical study will be 
highlighted and discussed in Section IV and Section V will serve as the conclusion and highlight 
further research opportunities.
4Section 2 
Literature Review
The literature review section of this paper consists of three separate subsections due to 
the breadth of the topics being discussed. The first section, Section 2.1, will serve as a review of 
the history o f the French Ligue 1, discussing the evolutions o f the corporate structure o f teams 
and the structure o f the transfer market. This section will also explore the 1995 landmark 
Bosman ruling. The following section, Section 2.2, will discuss the current literature concerning 
the growth in the overall soccer transfer market. This macro approach explains the evolution of 
the revenues o f clubs during the last 20 years which have led to the increase o f transfer fees. 
Lastly, Section 2.3 will focus on the micro aspect of the transfer market and will compare 
literature that is directly related to the empirical study that will be executed in subsequent 
sections o f the paper.
2.1 Development of Football in France
Professional soccer made its first appearance in 19th century England with the creation of 
the first association, the Football Association (FA). The FA arose in 1863, with the member 
clubs seeking to band together in order to create common rules and to promote the playing of the 
fledgling game (Drut, 2011). Despite the fact that the first clubs were still considered amateur, 
they were able to see the potential for revenue in the sport through the sale o f tickets to the 
matches. In 1885, in order to foster transparency and avoid the scandals that had been frequent 
during the days of amateurism, the Football Association officially instituted professionalism and 
created the world’s first professional soccer league. While soccer first crossed the English 
Channel to France with the creation of Le Havre AC in 1872, it would be another sixty years
5before France would follow the growing trend o f professionalism, with the French soccer teams 
remaining amateur clubs until 1932. At the turn o f the century, soccer in France was still not 
widely accepted by the citizens of the Republique. The sport, mostly played by the bourgeoisie 
and lower social classes in France, was frowned upon by the upper classes. With the 
remuneration o f players being considered, “inelegant and vulgar,” it is clear why French society 
did not make the switch from amateurism to professionalism until after most o f the other 
European states. (Drut, 2011)
French professional soccer took a setback during the invasion by Germany and the onset 
o f World War II. The Vichy government mimicked the sentiments of the upper class French 
society, rendering professionalism illegal stating that the career as a professional soccer player 
was, “decadent and immoral.” While soccer was played in Vichy France and by French soccer 
players in exile in England, it was not until the liberation o f France by Allied forces in 1945 that 
a professional league was restored in the Republique. With the creation of the Groupement des 
Clubs Autorises (Group of Authorized Clubs), certain clubs were picked by the league creators to 
join as professional teams, allowing the remuneration o f players. A distinct separation between 
the group o f professional teams, the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP), which exists in 
perpetuity today, and the amateur leagues, would last until 1970. Then, in 1970, a link was 
created between the LFP and the teams o f the lower leagues o f the Federation de Football 
Franqaise (FFF) allowing for the promotion and relegation of teams between Ligue 1 and Ligue 
2, which are the two professional leagues of the LFP, and the amateur leagues o f the FFF. The 
FFF is now France’s governing body that oversees all aspects o f its member teams which include 
the teams o f the LFP, lower division teams that comprise the departmental and regional leagues,
and France’s National Team structure which represents the country in all national team 
competitions.
In the last forty years, the evolution o f the commercial status of teams has contributed to 
increased capital and allowed for the teams in France to gain increasing revenues and profits. 
Originally, the teams in France were considered by the government as associations o f the Law of 
1901, which labeled the teams as but non lucrative (nonprofit). It was not until 1975 that the first 
commercialization arrived in French football at the team level. In 1975, a law allowed teams to 
pass from Associations a but non lucrative to Société D’économie Mixte Locoale (semi-public 
company), which allowed teams to receive both public funding from local entities, such as 
departmental, regional, and municipal government, while also maintaining private investment. 
The teams however were not allowed to be publicly traded. After a succession o f failed attempts 
by the French government to effectively liberalize the professional team structure, a new law was 
passed in 1999 which allowed the teams of the LFP to become highly attractive investments. In 
1999, the status o f Société Anonyme Sportive Professionnel (SASP) ushered into French 
professional soccer a new era o f expanded rights very similar to traditional companies and 
corporations. The new corporate structure enticed outside investment as the law authorized teams 
to both pay dividends and salary to the directors o f the club. In contrast to the other forms of 
structure, the financial capital o f an SASP team is not restricted to a fixed limit. The creation of 
the SASP structure was extremely important in the evolution of professional soccer as the teams 
approached the economic idea of a rational enterprise, whose objective, “according to 
neoclassical theory is to maximize profits,” (Drut, 2011). As noted by Drut (2011), as of the 
2011 season, all forty teams o f the LFP and six teams located in the highest division o f the FFF 
structure, Ligue National, have professional status. Likewise, of the twenty teams in the top
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7flight league, Ligue 1, only two teams, Auxerre and Ajaccio, do not have SASP status as both are 
associations. As the restraints were loosened on the French professional teams, their corporate 
structure became increasingly attractive for private investors, which has already been highlighted 
by the recent landmark purchase o f Paris St. Germain by QIA.
In 1995, a landmark court ruling by the European Court o f Justice changed the face of the 
soccer transfer market. Prior to this decision, a player was bound to the team for which he 
played, due to the fact that the team held their professional registration. A player was not allowed 
to play for another team unless that player’s registration was purchased or transferred to another 
team. A problem arose in 1990 when Jean-Marc Bosnian, a player for RFC Liege in Belgium, 
had his contract expire with no negotiated extension. At the end of his contract, it became 
apparent that RFC Liege no longer wanted the services o f Bosnian. However, the only team 
willing to purchase him, French team USL Dunkerque, was unwilling to pay the transfer fee 
demanded by RCL Liege for the transfer of Bosnian. Since Bosnian was unable to transfer 
teams, RCL Liege cut his pay and dropped him down from their top flight team, with Bosman 
being unable to join any other professional teams. Bosman soon brought suit against RCL Liege 
in a case that was brought before the European Court o f Justice, citing restrict o f trade as being 
infringed upon by the Belgian team.
The outcomes of the court ruling have permanently changed the nature o f the European 
transfer market. The court ruled that any team restricting the movement o f a citizen o f the 
European Union at the end of their contract was in violation of article 48 o f the Treaty of Rome. 
This portion of the document guarantees the right to free movement o f workers for European 
citizens between two member states of the European Union. The ruling created in European 
soccer a free agent market for when player’s contracts have ended. While this has been a staple
8part of American sports for a long time, the idea was brand new at its inception for Europe. The 
change for the transfer market comes in the form of free transfers once a player’s contract ends, 
since the team no longer controls his registration. This has led to teams being forced to sell their 
players earlier in their contracts and possibly for a lower price than their perceived value for the 
player in an attempt to realize some value from their investment before the expiration o f the 
contract. Numerous studies have been done highlighting the outcomes o f the Bosnian ruling, 
with the majority highlighting that globally transfer fees will see a rise due to increased 
competition of teams for the players. Drut (2011) highlights that the rate o f transfer for 
individual players has increased after the ruling. This has allowed superstar players to demand 
higher wages with the increased competition amongst teams. The interaction between time left 
on a player’s contract and the transfer fee has however not yet been explored due to the 
nondisclosure o f contract information of soccer players.
92.2 Macro Literature Review
In 2009, a transfer fee o f £80 million was paid by Spanish team Real Madrid for the 
transfer o f then Manchester United forward and Portuguese national, Cristiano Ronaldo, 
eclipsing the previous international record o f £53 million paid by Real Madrid for French 
midfielder, Zinedine Zidane in 2001. Instantly, a debate started over whether Real Madrid had 
over paid for the player’s ability and if  the overall increase in transfer prices was sustainable and 
beneficial to the soccer economy as a whole. While the economies o f the European Union were 
dealing with the worst national debt crisis in history and a recession that had plagued economic 
growth following the 2008 economic downturn, the soccer industry appeared to be continuing to 
grow. In fact, 11 o f the top 20 transfers o f all-time, when adjusted for inflation, transpired 
between the years o f 2008 and 2011. In France, Paris St. Germain, after the acquisition by the 
new Qatari management, paid a French team record of £36.6 million in 2011 for their newest 
superstar, the Argentinian midfielder, Javier Pastore. While the consumption o f items such as 
match tickets, traditionally a team’s main source o f revenue, are thought to be income elastic due 
to their status as luxury goods, the recent increase in transfer fees paid would suggest that the 
soccer industry has become recession proof with a diversification o f their revenue while allowing 
teams to continue bidding higher prices for new soccer talent.
On a macro level, according to Drat (2011), the overall increase in the magnitude o f 
transfers can be attributed to three major sectors o f a soccer team’s revenue making ventures. 
Traditionally, a soccer team’s main revenue source has been the gate ticket sales. For the 2003- 
2004 season, Manchester United, an English Premiere league team, attributed 40% of their 
annual revenue to ticket sales, representing the largest portion o f their income (Bourg and
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Gouguet, 2006). However, in France, the importance o f the gate sales has diminished as income 
from television sponsorships, merchandising and advertising sponsors have grown to be the most 
important source o f income. In comparison, Olympique Marseille, a team of the French Ligue 1, 
attributed 16% of their revenue from soccer operations to ticket sales for 2010-2011 season. For 
the teams o f the French Ligue 1, income from television contracts has changed drastically over 
the past twenty years. For the 1997 season, 25% of a team’s revenue was linked to TV contracts, 
while the same teams had 52% of their revenue derived from the TV contracts for the 2003-2004 
season. This number has approached 60% for the most recent seasons. Table 1 shows the 
evolution of television contracts over the last 30 years with an increase from € .8 million in 1983 
to the present contract o f €650 million negotiated in 2007-2008. Drut (2011) argues that these 
staunch increases in television contracts have been a direct determinant o f the increased fees paid 
for the transfer o f players. As is presented in the following section, research has been conducted 
that links the profit o f a team to the price it pays for a player in the transfer market. Drut (2011) 
also argues in his book that the disparity in teams’ revenues are due to many achievement based 
earnings, such as the UEFA Champions League, advertising money, and merchandising deals. 
Along with the relegation-promotion league structure these have led to great disparities between 
the top tier and lower tier teams, allowing the top tier teams to continue to perform better in a 
more costly transfer market.
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Table I
One example o f such performance based incentives is the allocation o f television
contracts. For the 2010 season, the French Ligue 1 champion, Marseille, received as part of the 
television rights contract with the LFP €50.8 million, of which €17.9 million were given due to 
their performance from the prior year. The three new teams that were promoted to the Ligue 1 
for the 2010 season received zero compensation for the year before, and thus were the lowest 
compensated teams through the television contract with €14 million total each for Le Mans, 
Boulogne-Sur-Mer, and Grenoble. As part o f the contract, teams also receive an unequally 
weighted portion based on their notoriety as a team. Auxerre, who finished in 3rd place, but is 
located in a small market region, received only €2.8 million extra, while Paris St. Germain, who 
finished a lowly 13th place, but is located in the lucrative television market o f Paris, received an 
additional €12.9 million for their notoriety, (Drut, 2011). With the larger market teams and the 
teams who perform best each year receiving a much larger amount of money, these teams are
Negiotated Television Contract in Real Euros
Negiotated Television Contract in 
Real Euros
1983-1984 1999-2000 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
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able to purchase the best players in the transfer market, thus perpetuating their domination o f the 
league. In France, and in most major European professional soccer leagues, there is a system of 
promotion and relegation, where each year the last 3 teams in the Ligue 1 are relegated down to 
Ligue 2, a lower competition level with much lower revenues, and the first 3 teams of Ligue 2 
are promoted to join the Ligue 1 teams. With the current revenue structure very few promoted 
teams are able to compete on a consistent basis with the established Ligue 1 teams due to a large 
disparity in income and thus caliber o f players. Between the years o f 1990 and 2010, in France, 
63% of the seasons were won by the same three teams, (Lyon, Marseille and Bordeaux). This 
trend o f domination amongst a few teams is common in Europe. In Scotland and Greece, three 
teams have won the championship every year during the same time period, while Portugal, 
Turkey, England, Spain, and the Netherlands each have had 90% or more o f their seasons won 
by the same three teams, (Drut, 2011). The presented facts demonstrate how the revenue 
structure from television contracts and the league formation with promotion and relegation has 
led to a competitive imbalance as the perpetual champions are able to continue paying the 
increasing transfer prices for the most skilled players.
Other performance-based disparities that have raised the revenue of the league’s top 
teams include the UEFA Champions League and merchandising revenues. The Champions 
League is a yearly tournament that matches the champions from all the leagues in European 
countries plus an allotted number of teams from various leagues in Europe. For example in 
France, the champion and the next two finishers qualify for the Champions League, while in 
England, due to a stronger field o f teams, the champion and the next three finishers qualify for 
the tournament. A country with a low level professional league such as Liechtenstein can only 
qualify one team in the tournament. For the 2009-2010 season €746 million were paid to the
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thirty two clubs who qualified for the opening rounds o f the Champions League. This money is 
added to the already skewed revenues o f the teams who are performing well. Teams earn 
additional revenue for winning games as they progress through the tournament, with the winner 
earning €19.3 million for the final game. In France, during the ten year span from 2000-2010, 
Olympique Lyon appeared in every edition o f the Champions League, which generated a total of 
225.4 million euro, which averages to 22.5 million euro a year. Other teams in France such as 
Marseille and Bordeaux were able to earn over 80 million euros during the same span. Not 
surprisingly, these are the same three aforementioned teams who won the majority o f league 
titles during a twenty year period. Merchandising revenues have been linked to a team’s 
location, due to the potential population of fans, and the number of celebrity soccer players on 
the team. Even though merchandising revenues only constitute about 10% of a team’s budget in 
the Ligue 1, there are still significant discrepancies between top and bottom flight teams that 
affect the ability to pay the higher transfer fees. In 2009, when Real Madrid purchased Cristiano 
Ronaldo from Manchester United, the team was able to recuperate a large portion o f the €94 
million fee that it paid by selling 1.2 million jerseys of the new celebrity for a price o f €85 a 
piece, o f which 30% was profit. This yields around €30.6 million for Real Madrid, a large 
portion o f the fee paid for Ronaldo. Such financing tools however are only valuable to teams that 
have a large enough fan base and are capable of attracting celebrity star players. The teams that 
are capable o f attracting such players are the teams that are consistently winning, thus 
perpetuating the performance gap. A similar situation to Real Madrid’s merchandise financing 
can be expected with the recent purchase of fan-favorite Javier Pastore by Paris St.-Germain in 
the large market o f Paris. Further research will have to be conducted however as his first year at 
the club has not yet been completed.
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2.3 Micro Literature Review
At a micro level, research on the determination o f players’ individual transfer fees has 
become increasingly available as the field grows. Tough competition amongst teams vying for 
the same limited skilled capital, in this case the superstars o f the soccer world, has prompted an 
expansion in the attempts to accurately value players and to seek to identify the qualities that 
determine the values. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Carmichael et al. (1999) are two of the 
more recent papers that attempt to create empirical formulas to derive a player’s market value. 
Their research however has been solely focused on the players in the English divisions o f soccer. 
This study will fill a gap in academic research by creating a study on the French sector of the 
transfer market. Likewise, a variety o f studies have been conducted on nontraditional aspects of 
the market. Reilly and Witt (1995) looked for, but found no evidence of, racial discrimination in 
the amount paid for the transfer o f players in English soccer. Torgler and Schmidt (2007) 
searched the Bundesliga, German professional soccer league, for evidence of increased 
performance as a function o f increased absolute or relative income finding a non-linear 
relationship between pay and performance. Lastly, Franck and Nuesch (2008) searched the 
Bundesliga to find the determinants o f superstar formation in finding that both on-field 
performance and the cultivation o f popularity through media sources and other outlets add to a 
player’s star quality.
The soccer transfer market fulfills two major roles in the international soccer world. 
According to Carmichael and Thomas (1993), the role of the transfer market is, “to facilitate and 
organize the acquisition and exchange of players by the clubs to enable the reconstitution of 
teams with the aim of increasing playing strengths...and to facilitate the movement o f players 
between clubs in their search for better opportunities, higher earnings, and increased job
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satisfaction.” The soccer transfer market however differs when compared to the American 
method of player movement. In American sports, traditionally, players are traded from one team 
to another in return for a combination o f other players, draft picks, and in rare cases, monetary 
compensation. The soccer transfer market operates mostly in a cash for player method, where 
one team makes a cash offer for the contracted player of another team. During two time 
windows, July 1st through midnight August 31st and January 1st through midnight January 31st, 
teams are free to enter into negotiations for the transfer o f players. For a player who is currently 
under contract by a team, the potential buying team must approach the selling team directly in 
negotiations over a transfer price. Once the two teams come to an agreement, the buying team is 
allowed to speak to the player concerning salary figures. Either the team or the player has the 
right to reject a transfer, at which point the transfer will not take place. Also, players may 
undergo temporary transfers in which the player is loaned to another team for 1, 3, 6, or 12 
months, with the buying club often paying the salary commitments for the loan period. The flow 
of players from different countries and continents is common as many players play in countries 
different from their home country. Some leagues such as the Major League Soccer in the United 
States and the English Premiere League have tried to take measures to limit the impact o f non- 
nationals by creating quotas for players from the home country on the rosters o f teams. As 
mentioned before, the Bosman ruling o f 1995 guarantees the free flow o f European Union 
citizens for employment purposes within the European Union, but the quota for non-citizens is 
created by the individual leagues. In order to promote fairness and to limit disputes the transfer 
market is highly regulated by FIFA and the individual national organizations.
In order to best understand the transfer o f players in the transfer market it is important to 
consider that soccer teams act as rational decision makers in the transfer market, searching to
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maximize profits, both financial and performance based, when looking to restructure their team. 
While the field has yet to be explored extensively, a debate has surfaced between two different 
schools of thought on the correct way to determine the value of players. Articles have been 
written by Carmichael and Thomas (1993), Reilly and Witt (1995), Dobson and Gerrard (1999), 
and Dobson, et al (2000) that focus on the estimation techniques on a bilateral monopoly 
bargaining model within a Nash-bargaining framework. Carmichael and Thomas (1993) note 
that, “the evaluation of any player would be expected to be based on player characteristic criteria 
which would include age, experience, playing record, star quality, together with a number of 
subjective factors such as potential. The fee paid should be based on the present value o f the 
future expected rents to be earned by the club from the player’s employment during the period of 
the contract.” When two profit maximizing teams enter into negotiations, there are numerous 
acceptable choices for the final transfer fee that would satisfy both teams. The resulting 
negotiated fee is thus the product of a negotiation that falls between the maximum amount of 
money that the buying team is willing to pay for the player and the reservation price, or 
minimum amount for which the selling team is willing to part with the player. A two-person 
Nash-bargaining model, as stated in Nash (1950), is characterized by two individuals who are 
both assumed to be highly rational, able to accurately compare their desires, and have equal 
bargaining skills and knowledge of the opposite individual. With the institution of fair financial 
practices in FIFA and increased transparency in the world soccer market, it is assumed that teams 
meet the qualities demanded of a Nash equilibrium. In order to quantify the relative bargaining 
strengths o f the two teams, the inclusion o f characteristics for both the buying and selling team 
are necessary in the model. Variables that capture playing success, attendance, and financial 
standing were found to be statistically significant in all of the studies.
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Dobson and Gerrard (1999), which focuses on the players of the English Football 
Association and Dobson et al. (2000), which focuses on the teams that are not in the top four 
leagues of English football, vary slightly from the other aforementioned article in their approach 
to the bargaining model in that they search for evidence o f monopoly rents present in the 
determination of transfer fees. As explained in Dobson et al. (2000), “Monopoly rents are present 
when the selling club extracts some of the excess of the buying club’s net valuation o f a player 
over the selling club’s reservation price.” A club’s reservation price is the lowest price for which 
it is willing to sell its player. The inclusion of monopoly rents shows that the potential price for 
the player will lie on a span between the vectors for the buying and selling clubs, with the 
vectors being a function of player characteristics and the respective club characteristics. This 
reaffirms the models used previously in the Carmichael and Thomas (1993) and Reilly and Witt 
(1995) articles. The results showing monopoly rents in English Premiere football through the 
two studies can be assumed to apply directly to the transfer market in French soccer, therefore 
the model used in this study will be similar in construction to the model used in the previous 
studies.
The results found in Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Dobson et al. (2000) show 
significant impact o f the variables included in their research on the dependent variable, the 
transfer price. The first study searches for the impact o f these variables in the top four leagues of 
English soccer (called league football) while the second is a similar study that proves a similar 
relationship for the variables in the non-league sector of English professional football. Dobson 
and Gerrard (1999) were able to attribute just over 79% of the variation in the transfer prices of 
English league players to the variables included in the model. This high level o f systematic 
variation in the determination of transfer fees reiterates the importance o f the variables in
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determining a player’s market value. All o f the variables that accounted for the player’s current 
form and personal characteristics were found to be significant at the .05 level or better. For the 
variables concerning the clubs, the characteristics o f the buying club were found to be significant 
at the .05 level while only the selling team’s league position in the year prior to the transfer and 
the selling team’s goal difference in the preceding year were found to be significant. The 
significance of the buying club’s variables serves as evidence of monopoly rents. With the joint 
significance o f the buying team’s variables with the selling team’s variables, it can be concluded 
based on the theoretical evidence presented in Dobson and Gerrard (1999) that the selling team 
does indeed extract monopoly rents in the market, thus making the transfer price o f a player a 
function o f the player’s characteristics and both clubs’ variables.
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, Carmichael et al. (1999) use a different 
approach from the previous bargaining models to establish their quantitative study. The authors 
argue that the previous studies failed to address the determinants of player mobility, which for 
the season covered in the study was a rarity with only 12.3 percent o f the population being 
transferred. The authors state that with a subsection o f the population being more likely to 
transfer than another, the players who are transferred are not part o f a random sample, but yet 
possess skills that influence the fee paid by the buying club and make their transfer atypical. 
Since there exists a section o f the population that is more likely to be transferred the authors 
write that an equation that uses Ordinary Least Squared estimation techniques will suffer from 
selection bias, which could lead to inconsistent and biased coefficients. The model employed 
utilizes the Heckman two-step technique which calls for a preliminary equation which 
determines the likelihood of a player’s transfer. The residuals from this equation are then 
employed to try to correct for any selection bias found in the secondary equation, which is the
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transfer fee determining model. As noted in Dobson and Gerrard (1999), this model has come 
under scrutiny for its departure from the bargaining and competition models previously 
employed. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) respond by suggesting that the selection-correction 
model, as the Carmichael et al. (1999) model is referred to, suffers from the exclusion o f the 
buying team’s characteristics in the preliminary model o f the Heckman two-step process. In the 
preliminary step of the model, all players, both those who were transferred and those who were 
not, are included in the data set in order to determine the likelihood o f a player’s transfer. The 
model does suggest that team characteristics do have an impact on the likeliness o f a player to be 
transferred. However due to the inclusion of players who were not transferred during the period, 
characteristics for the buying club could not be included since these players do not have any 
purchasing club. It is suggested by Dobson and Gerrard (1999) that the effects of the buying club 
characteristics will be observed in the estimation o f the transferred players, but that the exclusion 
of these variables from the preliminary model will cause model misspecification errors when the 
selection-correction model is constructed in the second portion o f the process. It is for this reason 
that this method has not been employed in the specification o f the model for this paper.
The results for the fee determinant equation o f the two-step Heckman process used in 
Carmichael et al. (1999), yield similar results to the model in Dobson and Gerrard (1999). 
Variables for age were significant showing a negative parabola for the fit o f the data. Likewise, 
experience in the league in previous years was significant and had a positive coefficient. Goals 
scored in both the league and one o f the national tournaments was significant with a positive 
impact on the transfer price o f the individual player. As in the study by Dobson and Gerrard 
(1999), international team experience was linked to a higher transfer price at the full national 
team level, not the youth team squad level. One difference between the two models was that in
the study by Dobson and Gerrard (1999), the positional dummy variables for the three major 
positions (forward, midfielder, and defense) were statistically significant, whereas in the 
Carmichael et al. (1999) study, the dummy variables were not shown to be significant. Overall 
the explanatory power of the Carmichael et al. (1999) model was relatively low with 41% of the 
change in transfer fees explained by the included variables. This is well below the .79 R2 
reported by Dobson and Gerrard (1999), and is most likely due to the exclusion o f data 
accounting for the impact of the two clubs involved in the transfer.
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Section 3
For the quantitative portion of this research, I constructed a micro level study of transfer 
prices using 3 years worth o f data on players transferred between teams in the French 
professional soccer leagues. In using Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis, I test the 
impact that certain player and team specific variables have on the negotiated transfer fee paid for 
a player. The regression uses a compilation o f individual variables for the players transferred, 
including variables that represent (i) the player’s on-field performance and personal 
characteristics, (ii) aspects o f the selling club, (iii) aspects o f the buying club, (iv) dummy 
variables to test for the positional aspects o f the transfer. For the study, the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm o f the transfer fee negotiated between the two clubs for the purchase o f a 
player (LNPrice). The form of the natural logarithm is assumed in order to best fit the data and 
to insure homoscedasticity, or a constant variance in the variables. The price listed in the data set 
is the nominal price paid for the player listed in British pounds. British pounds are used in this 
study due to the reporting standards o f the database used. Due to the brevity of the time span, it 
is assumed that the nominal fees will suffice in accurately determining the impact o f the 
independent variables. Also, for this study, the price is reported in British pounds due to the 
method of reporting transfer prices by the website used to find the data.
The data on the French sector o f the player transfer market for the empirical study 
was compiled from a German website that specializes in the compilation of data on soccer 
players.1 All variables were extracted from this website for the seasons spanning from June 1st, 
2008 to January 3 1st, 2011. The three seasons included in the data represent six different transfer 
windows, during which a total o f 116 unique transfers that satisfy the requirements for inclusion
1 www.transfermarkt.de
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in the study took place. Only transfers between two French teams, with the buying club being a 
member o f the Ligue 1 at the time o f the purchase were included in the data set to provide 
consistency in the variables. The data set only includes the transfers that had a disclosed fee 
reported to be greater than 0, which excludes the free transfers that take place due to the 
termination of contracts (linked to the Bosman ruling) and the rare case o f a player being 
transferred for an undisclosed amount. Likewise, Goalkeepers were excluded from the set as it is 
believed that their pricing is based on a separate set of variables that differ from those of field 
players, and thus do not have a place in this empirical study. For the data set, a total of 
£347,410,000 was spent by teams, with the highest transfer of £19,390,000 being paid for French 
national Yoann Gourcuff o f Olympique Lyon. In contrast, the lowest fee recorded was £110,000 
for the purchase o f the American national defender, Carlos Bocanegra by St. Etienne.
City or Town PRICE GOLS ASSISTS MINS FULLCAP AGE BCLP BCGD BCATT SCLP SCGD SCATT
Mean 2994913.79 4.98 2.62 24.20 19.67 24.70 9.75 6.76 22.78 15.30 0.20 17.60
Std. Dev. 3591871.16 5.56 2.99 8.83 21.81 2.97 6.01 15.30 13.62 9.28 14.99 11.26
Kurtosis 5.64 3.45 2.38 0.00 1.31 0.19 0.92 -0.60 -0.32 -0.26 0.26 1.12
Skew 2.32 1.75 1.51 -0.60 1.30 0.37 0.26 0.13 0.76 0.63 0.24 1.26
Table II-Table o f Descriptive Statistics
23
I chose for the set of independent variables, variables from four different subcategories in 
accordance with the research discussed in the literature review section o f the study. To capture 
the player’s on-field and personal characteristics into the model, six distinct variables were 
created. GOLS, ASSISTS, and MINS are a player’s total goals scored, assists recorded, and total 
minutes played respectively for the season preceding the transfer. FULLCAP is a combined 
variable that is the total number of games played for their respective country’s national team and 
youth national teams. All four of these variables have hypothesized positive signs, as it is 
believed that the more goals, assists and minutes a player has played, plus the greater experience 
a player has gained through national team call-ups, the greater their market value in the transfer 
market. Also in the player’s characteristics category are the variables AGE and AGESQ. These 
variables represent the player’s age at the time the transfer was executed as well as the squared 
value of the age. The squared value of age is included in the model so as to allow for the non- 
linear fit that is expected with age. Since a player typically increases in skill until reaching a 
plateau at their maximum potential, at which point their expected returns begin to diminish, age 
is best represented by a parabolic function, which is the result o f squaring age. For these two 
variables there are contradictory hypotheses. AGE is expected to have a positive sign which 
suggests that the transfer fee increases as age also increases, while AGESQ is expected to have a 
negative sign. AGESQ being negative would suggest a negative parabola form which has its 
stationary point at the y-value where a player’s market value has reached its maximum and 
begins to decrease. The same theory holds true for the variables GOLSQ and FULLCAPSQ, 
which are the squared values o f goals and national team appearances respectively. The two 
variables are also hypothesized to have negative signs.
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In order to capture the effects o f both the buying club and selling club, a congruent list of 
variables for both team have been included into the model. The variables BCLP and SCLP 
represent the clubs’ finishing positions in the league for the year prior to the transfer (1 being the 
best possible finish and 40 being the worst). Since some players were transferred from teams that 
were in the French Ligue 2 system, the variable allows for the continuation from Ligue 1 
(positions 1-20) to Ligue 2 with the first place team being listed as 21 and the last place team 
listed as 40. This technique has been used in prior studies to yield significant results (Dobson and 
Gerrard, 1999; Carmichael and Thomas, 1993). Both BCLP and SCLP are hypothesized to have 
negative values. For the buying club’s league position, as BCLP gets larger (note that the number 
getting larger means the team finished in a worse position) it is hypothesized that the price of the 
transfer will be lower since the better teams have more money with which to make the expensive 
transfer. Likewise for selling clubs, the relationship is expected to be negative as the better a 
team’s league position (smaller value) the more likely the team is to have better players that are 
valued higher. Conversely, weaker teams are expected to be selling worse players who cost less. 
To help capture the teams’ playing form the variables BCGD and SCGD have been included into 
the model. These represent the goal difference (goals scored -  goals allowed) for the two 
respective teams in the season prior to the transfer. Both variables have hypothesized positive 
signs for similar reasons. If the sign for BCGD is positive, this suggests that a team with a better 
goal difference would pay more for the transfer o f a player, which holds consistent to the 
research. Likewise, with a positive sign for SCGD, the better a team’s goal difference, the higher 
the cost of the player, which is consistent with the theory that the better teams have more 
expensive players. The last team variables are BCATT and SCATT, which are the respective 
average attendance for games in the season prior to a player’s transfer. Earlier sections o f the
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paper discuss the change in teams’ revenues as a function o f increased television contracts, 
merchandising and other soccer revenue. For the teams of the LFP, yearly financial statements 
are reported by the league on their website. Due to the fact that only the most recent three years 
o f financial data are available, and the fact that some of the teams do not report their revenue in 
the standard manner, attendance has been deemed an appropriate proxy variable. Over a three 
year time span, for the teams who had reported revenue, their average attendance and revenue 
had a .89 correlation coefficient, which makes attendance a suitable proxy for financial success. 
Both variables have hypothesized positive signs as buying clubs with higher average attendance 
are expected to have higher income and a better team, and therefore can pay higher amounts for 
better players. In response, selling clubs with higher attendance numbers are expected to be 
better teams whose players can command a higher value. The respective squared terms for 
attendance have been included into the final model in order to allow for a nonlinear fit for the 
variables. These should have negative estimated coefficients.
The last variables included in the model are positional dummy variables which will 
account for a significant difference in prices for any of three different positions, forward, 
midfield, and defense. For the variable FORDUM, a player receives a 1 if the player is a forward 
and a 0 if  the player is not, while for the variable MIDDUM, a player receives 1 if  he is a 
midfielder and a 0 for all other positions. It is difficult, in this situation, to hypothesize the 
potential sign for the beta coefficient o f the positional dummy variables. In previous research 
significant results were found between a player’s position and the price commanded for their 
transfer. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) found that dummies for both forward and defense were 
significant at the .05 level, which the beta coefficient for defense being larger than that of 
forward, suggesting that, ceteris paribas, a player who is a defender would have a higher market
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value than both a forward and a midfielder. However, in a different country and transfer market, 
it is unclear as to how the different positions will be interrelated.
Table III
Table of Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Signs
Variable Definition of Variable
Hypothesized
Sign
GOLS
GOLSSQ
ASSISTS
Number of goals scored in the season preceding the 
transfer
GOLS squared.
Assists recorded in the season preceding the transfer
+
-
+
+
+
MINS
Minutes played in all competitions in the season preceding 
the transfer, scaled by 10A-2
FULLCAP
Total number of games played for senior and youth 
national teams
FULLCAPSQ FULLCAP squared -
AGE Age of the player at the time of the transfer +
AGESQ AGE squared -
-BCLP
Finishing position of the buying club in the season 
preceding the transfer (1st place=l, positions 1-40)
BCGD
The goal difference for the buying club in the season 
preceding the transfer (Goals For-Goals Against) +
BCATT
Average attendance for Ligue 1 games in season preceding 
the transfer for the buying club, scaled by 10A-3 +
BCATTSQ BCATT squared -
SCLP
Finishing position of the selling club in the season 
preceding the transfer -
SCLPSQ SCLP squared +
SCGD
The goal difference for the selling club in the season 
preceding the transfer +
SCATT
SCATTSQ
FORDUM
DEFDUM
+
Average attendance for Ligue 1 games in season preceding 
the transfer for the selling club, scaled by 10A-3
SCATT squared
1 if the player is a forward, 0 if not
1 if the player is a defender, 0 if not
-
?
?
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Due to the different roles of players on the soccer pitch, certain positions obtain different 
amounts o f in game playing statistics. Defenders, who stay mainly near their own goal in order to 
protect the team from being scored against, rarely get the opportunity to score goals for their 
team. When analyzing the goals variable, a defender should have on average a substantially 
lower amount of goals scored when compared to either forwards or midfielders, who are judged 
on their scoring prowess. The same can be held true, but to a lower extent, for assists. Due to 
this, it becomes hard to create a model that accounts for the differences in the standards created 
for the different positions on a team, and could lead to a statistically less significant impact o f the 
amount of goals scored on the overall pricing of a soccer player.
As was previously discussed in Section 2.2, the Bosnian ruling has had a lasting impact 
on the transfer system in Europe. Due to the ruling, which created a free agent market for any 
player whose contract has expired with their previous team, teams are now forced to trade 
players earlier in the contracts in order to realize their market value without the risk o f the player 
leaving the team for free at the end of their contract. It can be believed that the amount o f time 
left on a player’s contract would have a significant impact on the price received by the selling 
club. As a player’s contract comes closer to ending, the reservation price set by the selling club 
should lower so as to attract a buyer and to realize the value o f their player before the end o f the 
contract. It is because o f this relationship that the amount o f years left on a contract should have 
a positive beta coefficient with the lowest transfer fee being accepted at essentially nil. 
Unfortunately, contract information for players remains classified information with a relatively 
modest amount of disclosed contracts. The addition of this variable to the model could improve 
its overall standing.
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Section 4
The final specification o f the model was tested using ordinary least squared regression 
analysis and runs through numerous econometric tests to validate the robustness o f the model. 
The following equation is the model specified by the regression output:
Y=α+β0+ β 1GOLS+ β 2GOLSSQ+ β 3ASSISTS+ β 4MINS+ β 5FULLCAP+ β 
6FULLCAPSQ+ β 7AGE+ β 8AGESQ+ β 9BCLP+ β 10BCGD+ β 11BCATT+ β 
12BCATTSQ+ β 13SCLP+ β 14SCLPSQ+ β 15SCGD+ β16SCATT+ β 17SCATTSQ
Results of Regression, Y=LNPRICE
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 7.6879 3.2324 2.3784 0.0193
GOLS 0.0613 0.0324 1.8929 0.0613
GOLSSQ -0.0030 0.0014 -2.1198 0.0366
ASSISTS 0.0473 0.0242 1.9550 0.0534
MINS 0.0300 0.0085 3.5057 0.0007
FULLCAP 0.0307 0.0082 3.7380 0.0003
FULLCAPSQ -0.0005 0.0001 -3.9966 0.0001
AGE 0.4376 0.2577 1.6980 0.0927
AG ESQ -0.0103 0.0051 -2.0136 0.0468
BCLP -0.0354 0.0142 -2.4970 0.0142
BCGD 0.0099 0.0055 1.7999 0.0750
BCATT 0.0802 0.0185 4.3331 0.0000
BCATTSQ -0.0010 0.0003 -3.1214 0.0024
SCLP -0.0608 0.0308 -1.9758 0.0510
SCLPSQ 0.0013 0.0008 1.6732 0.0975
SCGD -0.0063 0.0051 -1.2311 0.2212
SCATT 0.0662 0.0222 2.9823 0.0036
SCATTSQ -0.0011 0.0004 -2.5253 0.0132
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O f the seventeen variables included in the model a total of sixteen have a statistically significant 
impact on the change in transfer prices at the accepted .1 level or better. As shown in the table 
below, the explanatory power, R2, was reported as .718, which suggests that the variables 
included in the model account for about 72% of the variation in transfer prices. The reported F- 
statistic of 14.72 rejects the null hypothesis for the model that the estimated coefficients are zero, 
thus providing validation of the coefficients.
Goodness of Fit Statistics
R-squared 0.718587 Standard Error 0.616955
Adjusted R-squared 0.669771 F-statistic 14.72018
Diagnostic Test Statistics
Durbin-Watson stat 1.962244
White F-statistic 0.959217
Ramsey RESET F- 
Statistic 0.426631
When testing the diagnostics o f the model, no abnormalities were found in the results. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.97 is well above the critical value which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that no serial correlation exists. Likewise, in observing the data, there exists no 
evidence o f multicollinearity. The White test for heteroskedasticity provided an F-value o f .95, 
which is well below the critical chi-square value, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the 
model is homoskedastic. Lastly, the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification and omitted 
variables returned an F-statistic that failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is not model 
misspecification. Also, the addition of the fitted variables was insignificant which reinforces the 
lack o f error in the specification o f the model.
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For the variables concerning a player’s individual characteristics, all are significant at 
the.05 level. GOLS and GOLSSQ are both significant with a negative sign on the squared term, 
suggesting the negative nonlinear shape predicted in the theory section o f the study. ASSISTS 
and MINS are significant at the .05and .01 level respectively, suggesting that the two variables 
are better fit in a linear form, rather than goals which is best represented by a non-linear fit. The 
variables FULLCAP and FULLCAPSQ are both significant at well beyond the .01 level with the 
correct hypothesized signs. The inclusion of this variable in the model shows the increasing 
diversity in the French soccer leagues and the importance that national team experience at both 
the youth and senior team levels has on the development o f a player in the eyes of the 
professional teams. The last player specific variables, AGE and AGESQ, are significant at the .1 
and .05 levels respectively. The hypothesized signs o f positive and negative were present, thus 
confirming the theorized nonlinear relationship between age and price.
When analyzing the results for the club characteristics portion o f the model, evidence of 
monopoly rents are found, as is the case in other studies o f this nature cited earlier in Section II. 
The joint significance o f both buying and selling club variables reinforces the competition model 
outlined in Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Dobson et al. (2000), which states that the 
significance o f buying team variables jointly with selling team’s variables is evidence o f the 
selling team’s ability to extract a portion o f the nonnegative difference between their reservation 
price and the maximum price a buying team is willing to pay. For the buying club both their 
previous year’s league position (BCLP) and their goal differential from the previous year 
(BCGD) are significant with the p-value for BCLP reported as .01 and BCGD as .07. The league 
position coefficient has a negative sign which reinforces the theory that the better teams (best 
league position = 1) are paying higher prices for the players ceteris paribus, but could also be
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seen as the better are also buying better, more expensive players. Goal differential has a positive 
coefficient and follows the same theory as league position. BCATT and BCATTSQ are shown to 
have an impact on the price o f a player with significance beyond the .01 level. The negative 
coefficient follows the hypothesis that the better teams, with higher revenue from gate tickets, 
are able to pay higher prices for the players with a nonlinear fit. For the selling club, two of the 
three variables are shown to have significance; with the significant variables, SCATT and SCLP, 
found to have a nonlinear relationship. The significance of both squared terms shows a nonlinear 
relationship with the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of the transfer price. Lastly, when 
constructing the model, dummy variables were included to test for the impact that a player’s 
position has on their market value; however these variables are excluded from the final model 
due to a lack of statistical significance.
Section 5
This study expanded upon previous research in showing that many o f the variables and 
theories surrounding English transfer markets hold true for the French sector of the transfer 
market. On a macro level, transfer fees have been on the rise around the world driven by 
increased investment in soccer teams, increased revenue for the teams due to a boom in 
television contracts, and merchandising revenue. Superstars are commanding higher prices and 
the elite teams are competing for the same limited skilled capital, thus raising the prices globally. 
The competitive disparity between the best teams and the rest o f the league has led to a top heavy 
league, with the same teams winning the vast majority o f the titles and gaining the highest
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revenues each year. This trend, when combined with the continuing rise in revenue for the top 
teams, has led to a rise in transfer prices around the market.
The micro aspect o f the study generated a model that was able to account for around 72% 
of the variation in the transfer price o f a player when transferred between French teams. 
Variables for a player’s on-field abilities and characteristics were shown to have a significant 
impact on the player’s transfer price. Evidence of monopoly rents were found in the joint 
significance o f variables for both the buying and selling club. Overall the model provides a high 
level o f explanatory power, and provides a model which is capable o f estimating the transfer 
value of an individual player.
Future research on the subject is possible as there remains a portion o f the variation of 
transfer prices that is not explained by the current model. As explained in Section III o f the 
study, the inclusion of the years left in a player’s contract would likely be a significant factor due 
to the Bosman ruling. Other playing variables could provide an even clearer look into the 
valuation o f player’s by professional teams. Likewise, financial disclosure, which is a growing 
trend in FIFA due to new legislation called Fair Play, could provide increased explanatory power 
for the model. It is hypothesized that the profit for a team for the previous year and potentially 
for several lagged years could have an effect on the price paid by a team. Lastly, the model did 
not include goalkeepers. This unique position, with distinct judging criteria, was unable to be 
placed in the same model as field players. This could allow for another study that derives a 
model for the transfer price o f goalkeepers.
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